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Abstract 
We argue that transitional dynamics play a critical role in the evaluation of punitive 
incarceration reform on crime, inequality and the macroeconomy. Individuals’ past 
choices related to crime and employment under old policies have persistent consequences 
that limit their future responses to policy changes. Novel cohort evidence is provided 
in support of this mechanism. A quantitative model of this theory calibrated using 
restricted administrative data predicts nuanced, non-monotone dynamics of crime and 
incarceration similar to the U.S. experience following a single permanent increase in 
punitive incarceration in the 1980s. Increased inequality and declining employment 
accompany these changes and are borne unequally across generations. 
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1 Introduction 
Prior to the 1980’s the incarceration rate in the United States stood at a stable level comparable 
to other nations. Subsequently these paths have diverged, (see Figure 1).1 A four-fold expansion 
in the imprisonment rate from 1980 to 2000 has made incarceration a typical experience for less 
educated men in the United States despite recent modest declines.2 It is widely accepted that 
increased use of punitive incarceration stemming from major policy reforms beginning in the 1980s 
has contributed to this divergence.3 However, there remains a lack of consensus on how large this 
contribution has been.4 Similar questions remain as to how successful these reforms have been in 
reducing crime and of the magnitude of collateral costs on economic outcomes and inequality. 
In this paper we argue that understanding the dynamic consequences of policy reform— those 
changes slowly unfolding in the transitional decades following a policy change— is particularly 
important for assessing punitive incarceration policy.5 It is well documented that criminal behavior 
is very persistent, on average, at the individual level.6 Therefore, one would expect the deterrent 
eﬀect of increased use of punitive incarceration would be weak in the short run since the lingering 
consequences of past choices are hard to reverse even when punishment becomes more severe. A 
temporary spike in incarceration can then occur amidst inelastic short run behavior. This spike 
can translate to increased crime in the short-run when inmates are released if an incarceration 
experience increases future deviance through worsened labor market prospects or accumulated 
criminal capital. Ultimately, the full deterrent eﬀect is attained as new cohorts free to fully adjust 
their choices to the new policy replace cohorts born under the old policy and this causes both crime 
and incarceration fall in tandem. In this paper, we show this pattern remarkably similar to the 
U.S. experience after 1980: a monotonic decrease in crime alongside a rise and fall in incarceration; 
1See Burnham and Burnham (1999) for cross-country data and Hindelang (2016) for historical U.S. data. 
2On a given day in 2008 an estimated 12.0% (37.2%) of white (black) males age 20-34 without a high school degree 
were incarcerated, (Pettit (2012)). 
3Neal and Rick (2014) make this argument using the same administrative data as in this paper. See also Blumstein 
and Beck (1999), Pfaﬀ (2011), and Raphael and Stoll (2009). 
4Bushway (2011) points out little is also known about which speciﬁc policies have been most inﬂuential. 
5Analysis of the dynamic eﬀects of policy changes given the dynamic nature of individuals’ choices to participate 
in crime, appears little explored in the literature (McCrary (2010) provides a review). The closest related paper, 
I˙mrohorog˘lu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004), compares property crime in early 1980’s to late 1990’s assuming full transition 
to a new steady state after policy change. A large literature estimates dynamic models of criminal behavior, but do 
not include policy changes. 
6As many of half of the individuals released from prison in the U.S. will be reincarcerated within three years 
(calculated from the Department of Justice: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 data series.) 
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can stem from a single increase in punitive policy via these mechanisms.7 
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Figure 1: Crime rates from Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics (Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2017)). Incarcer­
ation rates 1925-82 from Cahalan and Parsons (Dec 1986) and 1983-2016 from Carson and Mulako-Wangota (2017) 
and include state and federal prisoners only. 
The unique cohort predictions of this theory are validated with a novel empirical strategy to 
separately identify age, cohort, and time eﬀects using a simple axillary model. We ﬁnd evidence 
of a “lost cohort” of individuals born in the mid-to-late 1960’s- individuals at the prime crime 
age of their 20’s in the 1980’s- that have higher rates of prison admission and arrests throughout 
their lives compared to generations before them and generations following. This is an important 
contribution because the criminal justice literature largely attributes the increased average age of 
criminals to a fundamental shift in the age proﬁle.8 We show this is actually only partially a shift 
in the age proﬁle, as the theory also predicts, and partially a cohort eﬀect. Cohort eﬀects bolster 
our claim that dynamics hold important welfare considerations for policy design. They imply costs 
and beneﬁts of blunt reforms are borne unequally across generations. 
To research the dynamic consequences of punitive incarceration policy reform, we develop an 
7This is a particularly important point given the inference on the relationship between aggregate crime and 
incarceration featured in policy discourse. For example, from Eisen and Cullen (2016): “Imprisonment and crime are 
not consistently negatively correlated... This contradicts the commonly held notion that prisons always keep down 
crime.” We provide an explicit model showing the ﬂaw in applying causal interpretation to aggregate series in this 
way that goes beyond convoluting orthogonal factors. 
8This is probably in response to the deteriorating view of age-proﬁles being remarkably stable across time and 
space as they had been prior to the end of the 20th century (Steﬀensmeier, Allan, Harer, and Streifel (1989) and 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). 
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over-lapping generations model with rich channels of criminal persistence. The starting point is a 
Beckerian model of rational crime in which agents face a pecuniary trade-oﬀ between labor market 
opportunities and crime. We enrich this model with additional elements necessary to replicate joint 
criminal persistence and labor market outcomes observed in data. The ﬁrst is human capital, which 
grows during employment and decays during non-employment, particularly when incarcerated. The 
second is criminal capital, some of which is set through choices early in life and is further increased 
during a prison sentence or decreased when abstaining from criminal behavior. The third is a 
criminal record that is observable by employers and can limit employment opportunities. These 
ingredients lead to divergent paths of individuals’ employment and criminal propensities consistent 
with micro-data: widespread crime amongst the young followed by high recidivism rates and low 
employment for those caught and incarcerated. 
We calibrate the model to quantitatively discipline the channels of criminal persistence by re­
quiring it to match both cross-sectional and aggregate data. Our calibration strategy allows use 
of an array of high-quality restricted administrative data from diﬀerent sources. These include 
administrative surveys (Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities); a three year panel of 
parole oﬃcer data on over 12,000 individuals (Recidivism of Felons on Probation, 1986-1989 ); and 
the wide-scale panel of annual prison censuses (National Corrections Reporting Program Data). 
This strategy is distinct from prior micro-econometric and structural estimations which have typi­
cally used survey data in which ex and future inmates answer questions on their employment and 
criminal activity. Obvious deﬁciencies of these data include non-response, incorrect responses, and 
small samples. By contrast, we use samples many times larger from more reliable administrative 
data. 9 
Our main quantitative exercise evaluates the contribution of increased use of punitive incarcera­
tion to the U.S. prison boom and other outcomes. We simulate in the calibrated model an increase 
in the probability of incarceration conditional on committing a crime from 2% to 8%, a similar 
magnitude to the increase in the U.S. from 1980-2000. The incarceration rate for the population 
increases from 1.7% to 3.2% percent over the ﬁrst 10 years then declines over the next 40 years 
towards a new steady-state incarceration rate of 2.0%. Weekly crimes per capita falls sharply by 
over half in the ﬁrst ﬁve years: from 0.7 to 0.3 due to the increased incapacitation of the most 
active criminals. After a decade the fall decelerates, gradually approaching 0.20 due to the higher 
9The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth includes a panel of interviews of a two cohorts of individuals before, 
during, and after imprisonment. The sample reporting incarceration is less than 200 and these individuals have many 
non-responses. 
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deterrence eﬀect on new-born generations. Furthermore, and in accordance with the data, crime 
becomes more concentrated among fewer and more persistent career criminals. The success of the 
theory to parsimoniously match non-targeted movements in the extensive and intensive margin of 
crime distinguishes it from other proposed theories of crime dynamics such as abortion (extensive 
only) or lead. Labor markets show interesting non-monotone dynamics. Over the ﬁrst 10 years 
of the policy the employment-to-population ratio falls by 1.5%, but subsequently it fully recovers. 
However, the policy change has large and permanent eﬀects on inequality due to criminal records. 
The average wage of those with a criminal record falls by 7-8% and their employment falls by 7% 
and 3% in the short and long-run, respectively. 
To the main exercise we add several illustrative experiments and decompositions. First, we 
examine the role of each channel of persistence in driving our results. We ﬁnd contemporaneous 
deterrence is most important, early life choices gain importance in the long run, and the labor 
market response of ﬁrms to those with criminal records is mostly unimportant. Next, we decom­
pose our results into the classic channels of incapacitation and deterrence. Incapacitation is most 
important for the short-run decline in crime, while deterrence gains importance in the long-run. 
Still, incapacitation remains quantitatively relevant in the long-run as crime becomes more concen­
trated among few individuals as a result of the policy change. Finally, we place these predictions 
in context relative to observed outcomes by simulating alternative scenarios where orthogonal ex­
ogenous changes in criminal rewards and real wages accompany policy reform. Increased crime 
rewards improve the model’s ﬁt to incarceration, but provide counterfactual increases in crime and 
counterfactual increases in the share of the population engaging in crime. We conclude that a 
combination of these type of other factors alongside policy changes are necessary to understand the 
evolution of crime and labor markets in the United States since the 1980s. 
Literature. The literature on crime features few structural equilibrium approaches. Engelhardt, 
Rocheteau, and Rupert (2008) consider how the ability of employers to write eﬃcient contracts 
tempers the labor market response to crime and vis-a-versa. Huang, Laing, and Wang (2004) and 
Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003) study interactions with the labor market in search frameworks. 
The most related papers are ˙ glu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004), Fella and Gallipoli (2014) and Imrohoro˘
Engelhardt (2010). ˙ glu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004) quantiﬁes the contributions of changes Imrohoro˘
in apprehension probability, labor markets, and population aging to the decline in property crime. 
Fella and Gallipoli (2014) also consider property crime, but evaluate the impact of educational policy 
as well as punitive policy on crime. Engelhardt (2010) develops a model with rich heterogeneity to 
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match the cross-sectional distribution of who commits property crime. Our work diﬀers because 
we consider transitional dynamics and all types of crime. We have similar ingredients of many of 
these models: pecuniary considerations that diﬀer based upon life-cycle human capital growth and 
upon employment status; and criminal capital or ﬁxed heterogeneity to account for patterns of 
crime that pecuniary features alone cannot match. As it will be come clear, we place extra care in 
parsing what components of heterogeneity are decided early and what depend on past criminal or 
labor market experience as this is important for transition dynamics. The reader should also keep 
in mind that the fact we target all types of crime causes our quantitative results to diﬀer from the 
aforementioned papers as well as other structural approaches with similar ingredients that focus 
on property crime alone.10 
2 A Simple Model of Criminal Persistence with Empirical Cohort 
Evidence 
In this section, we develop a simple model with two goals: (1) to illustrate the dynamic response to 
policy changes when criminality is persistent; and (2) to derive an empirical model of age, cohort, 
and time predictions of the theory used to test the theory in the data. The model features three key 
ingredients. First, there is an age-proﬁle for crime. Second, the youth crime decision is decreasing 
in the probability of imprisonment and has a persistent impact on crime throughout life. Third, a 
prison experience can increase future criminality. Let Cj,t and Ij,t be the crime and incarceration 
rates, respectively, of cohort j at time t. Let the relationship between these variables over time be 
provided by the following equations. 
Incarceration Rate Ij,t = πtCj,t 
Initial Crime Choice Xj,0 = g 
X (π) 
Evolution of Crime Rate Cj,t = Xj,tAa + Tt 
Xj,t = (φ + βπt−1)Xj,t−1 
The policy variable is πt: the probability of incarceration conditional on committing a crime. 
10For example Fu and Wolpin (2017). Lochner (2004) considers property and violent crime, but omits drug crime 
included in this analysis. 
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It is exogenous and can change over time. Assuming a large population, the incarceration rate for 
cohort j at time t is equal to that cohort’s crime rate Cj,t multiplied by the incarceration probability 
πt. 
The remaining equations explicate an extreme version of the cohort eﬀects found in the full 
structural model. In the full model, choices made under previous policies persistently aﬀect out­
comes even as the policy changes later in life. Here, we model that cohort eﬀect as a persistent 
component Xj,t, a function of both an initial crime choice and the policies πt uniquely experienced 
by a cohort over its life-cycle.11 The initial choice is given by a function gX (π) ∈ [0, 1]. We assume 
this function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in (0, 1) and that g�X (π) < 0, ie: that punitive 
policy deters. 
The ﬁnal two lines show the evolution of a cohort’s crime rate. An age proﬁle is provided 
both by a policy-invariant rate of life-cycle growth or decay (Aa) and by the impact of past crime 
and incarceration through the coeﬃcient term (φ + βπt−1).12 The coeﬃcient term (φ + βπt−1) 
relating Xj,t to Xj,t−1 has the following interpretation. The term φ < 1 captures the direct eﬀect 
crime today has on crime tomorrow. The term βπt−1 captures the eﬀect that a prison experience 
yesterday has on crime today. We assume β > 0 in which case a prison experience increases future 
crime or at least slows its decay.13 Both φ and β can be interpreted as some persistent criminal 
capital either formed by doing crime or going through prison.14 The transitory level eﬀect Tt is 
unrelated to policy will serve as a residual in the estimation. 
The ﬁrst set of predictions of this model, summarized in Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.2, 
explicate that cohort eﬀects can generate a dynamic transition following an increase in π. 15 While 
the cohort eﬀects are always present, whether or not the transition is non-monotone requires the 
elasticity of the initial crime choice to be large relative to the change in βπ. In other words, the 
impact of a prison experience on criminal persistence cannot be too large relative to the early life 
11If the policy does not change over time then there are no cohort or time eﬀects. 
12This speciﬁcation using age as a growth rate is key for econometric identiﬁcation. It is conceptually motivated by 
the life course and turning point theories in sociology (Elder Jr (1985)) and also motivated by the empirical proﬁles 
of crime as shown in detail in the online appendix. 
13Incarceration reforms can be studied for the case of β < 0, but as we show it seems empirically unlikely. 
14This speciﬁcation ﬁts with the reﬁnements of the life-course theory applied to criminal deviance arguing that past 
deviance and disadvantage weaken the general life-course decay in deviance (Sampson and Laub (1990) and Laub 
and Sampson (1993)). 
15The proofs here consider transition dynamics and look at relative quantities of crime, either across generations 
or across ages for a single cohort. The online appendix presents additional propositions and proofs concerning 
comparative statics on aggregate crime and incarceration levels with respect to the policy π. They show that crime 
and incarceration levels can either increase or decrease in response to an increase in π, depending on parameters. 
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deterrence. A suﬃcient condition is if crime falls in the new steady state, but this is not necessary. 
Taken together, Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.2 illustrate the importance of dynamics for policy 
evaluation in two ways. First, it shows that the timing of evaluating outcomes matters. Crime 
decreases less in the short run than in the new steady state. Incarceration increases more in the 
short run than in the ﬁnal steady state. Second, it shows that the costs and beneﬁts of a policy 
changes are borne diﬀerentially across cohorts. 
Proposition 2.1 (The cohort born immediately before an increase in π has higher age-speciﬁc 
crime and incarceration rates at all ages than all cohorts it precedes and follows.). Let an initial 
π0 be given. Denote with hat notation the variables related to the cohort born at t¯ − 1 where t¯ is 
when the policy is changed to π > π0. Then: 
= ¯Cˆ >Cs,t−jˆ+s ∀ t > t¯+ 1 and s  t + 1 j,t 
Iˆ > I ∀ t > ¯ and s  tt = ¯j,t s,t−jˆ+s 
Proof. See Online Appendix. 
Corollary 2.2 (The transition paths of crime and incarceration after an increase in punitiveness 
are non-monotone if the elasticity of the initial choice is suﬃciently large relative to the eﬀect of 
prison on criminal persistence.). Let an initial π0 be given and consider the economy at a steady 
state for that π0. Assume at time-zero the policy switches permanently and unexpectedly to π1 > π0. 
Then: 
• a) The transition path for crime is non-monotone iﬀ 
 M−1 gx(π0) (φ + βπ1)a + 1a=0>  M−1gx(π1) (φ + βπ0)a + 1 a=0 
• b) The transition path for crime is non-monotone iﬀ 
 M−1π0gx(π0) (φ + βπ1)a + 1a=0>  M−1π1gx(π1) a=0 (φ + βπ0)a + 1 
Proof. See Online Appendix. 
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The second result from this model is summarized in Proposition 2.3. It states that if a prison 
experience increases criminal persistence, then the age proﬁle of crime looks diﬀerent in steady states 
with diﬀerent incarceration probabilities π. In particular, as π increases crime is more persistent 
over the life-cycle resulting in higher incarceration rates for old individuals relative to young. 
Proposition 2.3 (If a prison experience increases criminality, then a steady state with a higher 
incarceration policy exhibits higher crime and incarceration at older ages relative to young ). Let 
ˆtwo policies ˆ Xa be the persistent component of crime at age a in the π > π be given and and Xa 
steady-state for each policy, respectively. Then: 
Xˆa Xa 
> ∀ s ∈ (1, a)
Xˆa−s Xa−s 
Proof. See Online Appendix. 
The change in the life-cycle proﬁle at the steady state when the policy increases occurs when 
a prison experience slows the life-cycle decay of crime. While crime decays monotonically over 
the life-cycle, incarceration is hump-shaped. Applying this model to incarceration it predicts the 
peak of life-cycle crime will move to older ages for β suﬃciently large. This result is particularly 
important for how we think about time and age eﬀects in the data. It is consistent with shifts 
towards deviance at older ages that are shown to be salient in the data as seen in Figure 2(b). It 
also suggests that only a portion of this shift is a permanent component interpreted as the eﬀect 
of changes in policy. Both the permanent shift and the transitory cohort eﬀect from a simulation 
of the simple model can be seen in Figure 2 as an additional visual check on our propositions.16 
Figure 4(d) illustrates the point that the inclusion of both the persistence of prior choices made 
under old policies (Xj,0 = g
X (π)) and the assumption that incarceration increases (or slows the 
decay of) future deviance (β > 0) are critical for providing cohort eﬀects that generate a non-
monotonic transition. The baseline features both ingredients. The line “No Early Choice” sets 
initial crime X0 as a constant independent of policy π. In this case, crime monotonically increases 
when policy π increases at time 0. The line “No Prison Persistence” sets the impact of a prison 
experience on future crime to zero (β = 0) In this case, crime monotonically decreases when policy 
π increases at time 0. Incarceration is similar, except both the non-monotonicity and the ﬁnal 
steady state levels depend in the elasticity of the crime choice with respect to the policy π. A 
16The model data are illustrative and for an arbitrary calibration: φ = 0.5 , β = 0.9, g(π) = 1 − e −π , and 8 age 
groups. We consider a shift from π = 0.1 to π = 0.4. 
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non-monotone transition and a smaller increase in incarceration (or even a decrease) in the ﬁnal 
steady state are more likely when this elasticity is high. This is an important point for multiple 
reasons. It veriﬁes that in order to replicate cohort features of the data, we need both an early life 
choice and for prison to aﬀect future criminality. It also strikes at the policy crux of the paper: 
these are the two mechanisms that make policy evaluation using observed outcomes so diﬀerent 
depending on the timing of the evaluation and they create diﬀerential costs across cohorts.17 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Year
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Crime Transition
Baseline
No Early Choice
No Prison Persistence
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Incarceration Transition
Baseline
No Early Choice
No Prison Persistence
(a) Crime- High Elasticity (b) Incarceration- High Elasticity 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Year
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Crime Transition
Baseline
No Early Choice
No Prison Persistence
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Year
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Incarceration Transition
Baseline
No Early Choice
No Prison Persistence
(c) Crime- Low Elasticity (d) Incarceration- Low Elasticity 
Figure 4: Crime and Incarceration over a Transition in the Simple Model. The ﬁrst 
(second) row sets the elasticity of the initial crime choice to be high (low) with respect to the 
probability of prison conditional on committing a crime. 
17Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2010) summarize the range of assumptions required to employ aggregate regressions 
to estimate deterrence of policy within even a steady state framework. 
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Regression Speciﬁcation. The manner in which all four eﬀects enter this simple model is 
crucial for identiﬁcation. In a simple linear regression where these elements enter additively, they 
are co-linear and only two may be identiﬁed at once. By contrast, the theoretical model imposes 
an explicit structure in which these eﬀects are not additive and co-linear.18 This allows a novel 
estimation of the association between these three factors and trends in arrests and incarceration 
overtime.19 
Conceptually, age aﬀects growth rates while the time and cohort eﬀects impact levels. However, 
the age proﬁle will change permanently in response to a permanent change in punitive policy π. 20 
A two-step procedure, intuitively separates these components into growth rate and level eﬀects.21 
A summary of the procedure is to ﬁrst estimate time-varying growth rate eﬀects, generate residuals 
from the predicted values, and then estimate time and cohort eﬀects on these residuals. The ﬁrst 
stage interprets the eﬀect of age to match the shape of the life-cycle proﬁle and the eﬀect of policy 
changes to match how this proﬁle changes over time. The second stage estimates time and cohort 
eﬀects to best match the level of the life-cycle proﬁle of cohorts. The cohort component shifts a 
single cohort’s age-proﬁle crated from the ﬁrst stage up or down. The time-level component ﬁlls 
in gaps for years when individuals of all ages increase or decrease crime. The critical diﬀerence 
between the time eﬀects in the ﬁrst and in second stage is that in the ﬁrst stage, individuals are 
aﬀected in proportion to their prior behavior where as in the second stage it is a common level 
eﬀect for all individuals. 
The resulting cohort and time coeﬃcients of the second step are presented visually for incar­
ceration in Figure 2 and for arrests in Figure 2. 22 The peak time eﬀect for prison admissions is 
the year 1990. This occurs in the ﬁrst third of the peak of the total crime index. Cohort eﬀects in 
arrests peak for the cohorts born in the early 1960’s while cohort eﬀects for prison admissions peak 
a couple of years later. These facts together are consistent with our theory of how a more punitive 
incarceration policy should diﬀerentially aﬀect cohorts. The time eﬀect in admissions rises sharply 
18An alternative approach would follow Lagakos, Moll, Porzio, Qian, and Schoellman (2016) in using theory to 
identify where the age eﬀect is negligible. 
19This is an important contribution to the criminal justice literature which has mostly focused on the changing 
age-structure of prison admissions, something we demonstrate can be attributed partially to cohort eﬀects. 
20This strategy relates to Schulhofer-Wohl and Yang (2016). We overcome co-linearity by placing more structure on 
the nature of the age eﬀects. We also directly address the issue raised in Schulhofer-Wohl and Yang (2016) advocating 
that the age eﬀect may be changing over time and cohorts. 
21In the online appendix we show how the procedure and all of the following interpretations are derived directly 
from the simple model in this section. 
22See the online appendix for details of the dataset and variable construction. The appendix also presents estimates 
of these eﬀects for each of the three major crime categories: Drugs, Property, and Violent. 
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through the late 1980’s. The cohort with the highest cohort eﬀect would have been in their early 
20’s during this escalation, approaching the peak of the age proﬁle of a typical criminal life-cycle 
proﬁle. Thus they cultivated their criminal careers prior to the time-related increase in punitive 
admissions and were at the peak of their careers where behavior is less elastic when the policy 
tightened. 
One word of caution is to take into consideration the relative magnitude of cohort and time 
eﬀects in each series. Time eﬀects are about double the magnitude of cohort eﬀects in prison 
admissions. Cohorts are relatively more important for arrests.23 
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23The online appendix presents results for each type of crime: Violent, Property, and Drug. 
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3 Quantitative Model 
We present a quantitative model built on Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003) and Engelhardt, 
Rocheteau, and Rupert (2008) to show how punitive incarceration policy aﬀects crime rates, in­
carceration rates and labor market outcomes. Following Becker (1968), the main cost of crime is 
forgone labor market opportunities. Incarceration policy ampliﬁes this cost through two channels. 
The ﬁrst is at the individual level: an increase in the likelihood of incarceration increases the ex­
pectation of lost employment opportunities when an individual engages in crime. The second is at 
the aggregate level: incarceration policy and subsequent changes in the aggregate crime rate can 
decrease job arrival rates if ﬁrms’ proﬁts suﬀer and they respond by creating fewer jobs. 
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a continuum of ﬁnitely-lived ex-ante identical 
individuals and identical ﬁrms. Individuals have linear preferences over consumption and discount 
the future at rate 0 < r < 1. At any point in time, individuals can be in any of three labor 
market states: (i) employment; (ii) unemployment; or (iii) incarcerated. Employed individuals are 
currently matched with one ﬁrm. Unemployed individuals are those agents not currently matched 
with a ﬁrm, but searching for a job. Lastly, incarcerated individuals are those agents currently in 
prison. 
3.1 Individual’s Problem: 
Unemployed individuals receive ﬂow consumption b. Employment opportunities arrive at the pois-
son rate λw. All jobs are identical. Upon receiving a job opportunity, the unemployed individual 
can either accept the oﬀer or reject it. If they accept, they become employed and receive a ﬂow 
wage proportional to their human capital (productivity) level: w. 24 Employed individuals receive 
job separation shock at poisson rate δ upon which they become unemployed. 
All individuals outside of the prison receive crime opportunities at poisson rate η. Crime 
opportunities are characterized by an instantaneous reward of κ. These rewards are drawn from a 
common distribution H (κ). The reward associated with a particular crime opportunity is observed 
to the individual before they make the choice of whether to commit the crime or not. If they choose 
to commit the crime, they receive the reward and, with probability π, they are caught and sent to 
prison. 
24In the simple model all agents have an identical, permanent level of human capital. A rich human capital process 
is introduced in the quantitative model. 
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Incarcerated individuals receive zero ﬂow beneﬁt while incarcerated. They receive a prison exit
 
shock at rate τ upon which they are released and become unemployed. 
We allow for several sources of heterogeneity across individuals: criminal capital, human capital, 
incarceration experience and age. The latter two sources (incarceration experience and age) provide 
an important link from the model to the data. They allow us to study the heterogeneous eﬀects of 
the criminal policies for individuals along observable dimensions. The ﬁrst two sources (criminal 
and human capital) are important for the quantitative performance of the model along dimensions 
that are not accounted for by observables. They will also contribute to the persistence of criminality 
and help generate the cohort eﬀects that we have found in Section 2. 
Labor market opportunities result in additional ex-post heterogeneity across individuals. Luck 
in job arrival and separation shocks, as well as incarceration incidence following a crime, generate 
diﬀerent labor market statuses across individuals. 
To better match the data along several dimensions, we introduce heterogeneity in criminal cap­
ital. We assume two types of criminal capital: low (lc) and high (hc). Both types probabilistically 
receive crime opportunities drawn from the criminal reward distribution and decides whether or not 
they are worth committing. We call these crimes “rational crimes”. High criminal capital types 
uniquely receive additional crime opportunities at the rate ηhc that they must commit. These 
crimes bring no instantaneous beneﬁt to the individual. We call these crimes “irrational crimes”. 
All individuals are initially born with low criminal capital. Upon committing a crime a low criminal 
capital type becomes high criminal capital type with probability ν. Criminal capital can also be 
built in prison. During each period in prison, a low criminal capital type becomes high criminal 
capital type with probability νp. A high criminal capital type becomes a low criminal capital type 
each period with probability ξ. This feature is instrumentally allows the model to match recidi­
vism rates in the data that otherwise could not be accounted for. Recidivism rates are important 
because, for a given amount of crime, they dictate the share of the population engaged in crime 
by pinning down individuals’ crime intensities. In Section 6.1 we show a model estimated without 
this ingredient is counterfactual to the data in a way that we argue skews the policy implications 
of the model. 
The third ex-post heterogeneity happens due to stochastic changes in human capital. Each indi­
vidual is endowed with an initial human capital level, identical across individuals. We assume that 
human capital stochastically increases on the job, and stochastically decreases while unemployed or 
incarcerated. We assume that human capital shock arrives at the poisson rate ψi, and upon arrival 
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human capital evolves according to labor status dependent function fi (h) given current human 
capital level h. That is, h� = fi (h) where i ∈ {e, u, p}. 
The fourth dimension of heterogeneity is a criminal record signifying past imprisonment observ­
able by employers. As a result, there will be two types of jobs in the economy, one for individuals 
who have never been incarcerated, called non-ﬂagged individuals, and one for the individuals who 
have been incarcerated at least once, called ﬂagged individuals. We denote k as the ﬂag type, 
and k = 0 refers to non-ﬂagged whereas k = 1 refers to ﬂagged individual. The main motivation 
for including this feature is to capture the fact that in real life criminal record is accessible by 
the employers and the size of the equilibrium eﬀect of this access on both workers with records 
and those without is very much an open question.25 Although, employers cannot observe certain 
characteristics of the individuals, like future crime propensities, they can extract some information 
through their incarceration experience summarized by this ﬂag. So, in the model, this ﬂag indicator 
will play the signalling role for the employers to infer the crime propensity of the individual. 
The last dimension of heterogeneity is the age dimension. Age m ∈ M = {1, ..., m¯} individuals 
become age m + 1 at the poisson rate ϑm. 
26 They live at most to the age of m¯. When age 
m¯ individuals receive aging shock, they exit the economy by receiving zero utility, and they are 
replaced with age 1 individuals who start life with the lowest skill level and as unemployed. 
3.2 Matching 
We assume that employers can observe the ﬂag type k and the age of the individuals m. They 
create jobs conditional on these traits. This segments the economy into 2M labor markets because 
workers search only for jobs suitable to their observable traits. We assume that each type of 
the labor market is modeled as in Pissarides (1985). That is, employers with vacant jobs and 
unemployed workers meet randomly according to an aggregate matching function, M (ukm, vkm) 
where ukm and vkm are the number of unemployed workers and vacant jobs for individuals with 
ﬂag type k and age m. We assume that the matching function is strictly increasing in both terms 
25Harmonized electronic records across jurisdictions began to be available in the mid-1990’s. However, analyzing 
the impacts of record access is non-trivial because access remained highly variable across states for over a decade. 
Also, explicit records are unlikely to be the only avenue through which criminal history could be ascertained. These 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper. 
26Stochastic aging is a standard method of reducing the state space (in this case to 3 age groups instead of 2392 
age-weeks) to make the computation feasible 
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and has constant returns to scale. The job arrival rate for workers is expressed as
 
λk,m = M (ukm, vkm) /ukm = M (1, vkm/ukm) = M (1, θkm) , (3.1)w 
where θkm is the market tightness for type-km jobs. Similarly, vacant job ﬁlling rate for ﬁrms is 
expressed as 
λk,m = M (ukm, vkm) /vkm = M (ukm/vkm, 1) = M (1/θkm, 1) = λ
k,m /θkm. (3.2)f w 
3.3 Firm’s Problem: 
Now, we turn to a ﬁrm’s problem: Firms incur a ﬂow cost k to post a vacancy. Upon meeting 
with a worker, the match turns into an employment contract as long as the surplus of the match is 
positive. By hiring a worker, the match produces y = p, the worker receives a wage w, and the ﬁrm 
collects proﬁts p − w. The match dissolves if either (i) the worker receives a separation shock; or 
(ii) if the worker commits a crime and gets caught. We assume that the wage is a constant fraction 
of the worker’s productivity. 
3.4 Early-life Choice 
Finally, we allow for an early-life choice that aﬀects later criminal activity and is irreversible. We 
assume that at the beginning of life, individuals can pay a cost to increase their crime arrival rate 
η. Once it is chosen it will be ﬁxed for the rest of life of the individual. The motivation behind 
such a choice is related to the near consensus reached across economics, sociology, and criminology 
that early life choices are instrumental in later life outcomes. These choices include things like 
eﬀort in school, which peers to associate with, or even parents’ choices. For our purposes, this 
feature will pick up the residual cohort eﬀects documented in the data that cannot be accounted 
for by the criminal persistence provided by other features of the model. It accounts for the limited 
elasticity of criminal behavior for cohorts born prior to a policy change. Speciﬁcally, we assume 
that individuals choose their crime arrival rates by solving the following problem: 
ηρ 
max −A + EV 1,0 (h0; η) (3.3)uη ρ 
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where A and ρ are parameters to be calibrated. The ﬁrst term in the above optimization problem, 
Aη
ρ 27 
ρ , captures, in a reduced form, the unmodeled costs of choosing a higher crime arrival rate η. 
28 
In the online appendix, we provide several analytical predictions of a simpler model to illustrate 
the mechanisms discussed intuitively and decomposed quantitatively in Section 6. 
4 Calibration and Estimation 
We calibrate our model such that the initial steady state replicates empirical moments from the 
late 1970’s and early 1980’s according to data availability. The assumption of a steady state at this 
time is motivated by the prior century of stable rates (see 1).29 While most parameters are jointly 
estimated to minimize the distance between the model and data statistics, we brieﬂy provide a 
heuristic explanation of the moments most informative to diﬀerent parameters. A full description 
of data sets, the calculation of target statistics, and the estimation procedure can be found in the 
Online Appendix. 
4.1 Externally Calibrated Parameters 
The time period is set to be one week. We assume that on average young individuals live for 7 
years (between ages 18 and 24), middle-age individuals live for 10 years (between ages 25 and 34), 
and old individuals live for 30 years (between ages 35 and 64).30 We set the prison exit probability 
to 0.007 implying 2.7 years of prison time on average, consistent with Raphael and Stoll (2009).31 
The probability of getting caught upon committing a crime, π, is set to 2% in accordance to our 
27These costs include forgone education opportunities and higher income opportunities associated with that and 
any non-pecuniary costs of being associated in higher crime activities. 
28To be clear: there is no ex-ante heterogeneity across individuals in the model: in the stationary environment 
individuals will choose exactly the same crime arrival rate. However, when we study the transitional dynamics, that 
will generate heterogeneity in crime arrival rates across cohorts since along the transition the return to crime will be 
changing. 
29Indeed, rates were so remarkably stable across space and time that a theory of a “natural rate” of incarceration 
was prominent for many decades, (Blumstein and Cohen (1973). 
30These average life-time for each age group implies the stochastic aging probabilities of ϑy = 0.00275, ϑm = 
0.00192, and ϑo = 0.00064 for the young, middle and old, respectively. 
31Raphael and Stoll (2009) also show that increases in admissions rates on new charges account for more than half 
of the rise in incarceration rates and when combined with parole failure would account for 90%. This leaves little 
room for considering changes in length of incarceration spells and so we do not include this. 
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Table 1: Externally Calibrated Parameters 
Preset Parameters 
Parameter Explanation Value
 
ϑy aging prob - young 0.00275 
ϑm aging prob - middle 0.00192 
ϑo aging prob - old 0.00064 
τ prison exit prob 0.007 
r discount factor 0.001 
π arrest prob 0.02 
b unemployment beneﬁt 40% 
µκ mean of criminal reward 13 
σκ std of criminal reward 2.265 
ϕ matching function curvature 0.72 
χ matching function constant 0.14 
w wage share 0.5 
own calculations which are consistent with Pettit (2012).32 
We choose r = 0.1 to provide an annual discount factor of 0.95. We assume that the criminal 
reward is drawn from a log-normal distribution with mean µκ and standard deviation σκ. We set 
µκ = 0 and calibrate σκ to equal one half of the average annual labor income.
33 This gives us 
σk = 2.265. 
We follow Shimer (2005) for the matching function: 
1−ϕM (u, v) = χuϕ v 
where u is the unemployment rate and v is the vacancy rate. As in Shimer (2005), we set the 
ﬂow utility of unemployment b to equal 40%; the matching function curvature ϕ to 0.72; and the 
matching function constant χ to 0.14. We assume that when workers and ﬁrms meet, they share 
the surplus equally, so we set the wage to be 50% of the productivity of the worker. 
Table 1 shows the externally calibrated parameter values of the model. 
32Please see the online appendix for details of our calculation of this number. 
33We lack data on the realized beneﬁts of criminal activities necessary to identify the crime reward distribution 
and arrival rate of crime opportunities separately, for crimes other than property crimes like violent and drug related 
crimes. As a result, we ﬁx the crime reward distribution and calibrate the crime arrival rate using data on incarceration 
rates. However, past research on property crime and illicit drug sales income emphasize the importance of the skewness 
of the distribution, thus aﬃrming our log-normal assumption, (see the literature review in Freeman (1999)). In the 
Appendix we provide robustness results with respect to the crime reward distribution parameters. 
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4.2 Internally Calibrated Parameters 
The rest of the parameters in the model are calibrated jointly by minimizing the percentage devi­
ation of the model generated moments from the data moments. 
Labor Market Parameters: There are two parameters related to labor markets: exogenous 
job separation rate and vacancy cost. As in the literature, we calibrate these parameters to match 
average employment rate of black and white men between the ages of 18 and 34, without a high 
school degree in the 1980s: 71% as calculated from the 1980 U.S. Census; and the median non-
employment duration of this population: 20 weeks as calculated from the NLSY.34 
Human Capital Parameters: We consider human capital to evolve on an exponential grid 
with an exponent ς. 35 As in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), we assume a constant probability that 
human capital increases by one level during each period of employment and a diﬀerent constant 
probability that it decreases by one level while either unemployed or incarcerated. We estimate the 
curvature ς jointly with the arrival rates of the human capital shock when employed, ψe, and when 
non-employed (unemployed or incarcerated), ψu = ψp by the method of indirect inference. The 
goal is to replicate in model generated data the coeﬃcients from the following regression relating 
spells of employment and non-employment to wages estimated in the NLSY: 
ln(wit) = α + β
AAit + β
A2(Ait)
2 + βN Nit + β
N2(Nit)
2 + γi +  it (4.1) 
where wit is the observed wages for employed individual i at time t, A is the age of the individual, 
N is the months of non-employment including unemployment, non-participation and incarceration 
in the last two years, and γi is the individual ﬁxed eﬀects. We included the square terms for age 
and non-employment spell to capture the non-linearities in the human capital process incorporated 
in the model data via the curvature parameter ς. 
34Census data accessed through IPUMS (Steven Ruggles and Sobek. (2018)). Data from National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) accessed through Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S Department of Labor (2014) and is for 
the 1979 cohort only. 
35We set the support of the human capital process as h = 1 and h = 3. Given this support, we space N grid points p sς 
between h and h such that hi = h + (h − h) Ni−−11 for every i = 1, 2, ...N . We set N = 21 in the estimation. This 
curvature replicates the concave human capital process prevalent in the data in a similar way as Kitao, Ljungqvist, 
and Sargent (2017). Although estimated parameters change, results are quantitatively and qualitatively robust to 
the number of grid points and the support. 
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We create a panel identical to the NLSY using the simulated data from the model on which 
to run the same regression. It features the same number of individuals and the individuals’ actual 
ages in years. We transform the weekly model data to a monthly frequency as in the NLSY using 
the maximum wage of the individual in the last month as wage observation. 
Crime Parameters: Crime opportunities are exogenous and arrive at the same probability when 
employed or unemployed. The calibration targets informative about these parameters are incar­
ceration rates.36 We assume the crime arrival rate for young and middle-age individuals with zero 
criminal capital are the same. We set the crime arrival rate for the old individuals with zero criminal 
capital to 0. The underlying assumption of this empirical strategy is that all crime of the old is done 
by individuals who have committed crimes in their young or middle age years. This assumption 
is motivated by the very low admission rate of individuals over age 34 with clean criminal records 
(<1%, authors’ calculations from NACJD data). 
Criminal capital is binary: high or low. There are four parameters related to criminal capital 
process: the probability of gaining high criminal capital after committing a crime without being 
incarcerated, ν; the probability of gaining high criminal capital when incarcerated, νp; the prob­
ability of losing high criminal capital, ξ; and the additional crime arrival rate for high criminal 
capital individuals, ηhc . 
Statistics on repeated incarceration are informative about the share of high criminal capital 
types and the additional crimes they commit. We add to our estimation targets the three-year 
re-imprisonment rate for the released prisoners.37 This rate is 20% young and middle age groups 
in the data. 
The next target is the fraction of the population who are incarcerated by the age of 35. In the 
data, 19% of the population have been to jail or prison at least one time by the age of 35 (NLSY). In 
the model, the probability of gaining criminal capital, ν is a crucial parameter to capture this fact. 
If ν = 0, crime will be more widespread among the population, whereas as ν becomes larger, crime 
will be concentrated among a few individuals. The incarceration rate of old individuals (age 35 to 
36The median exit rate is observable and calibrated directly, leaving inﬂow rates to be inferred in order to match 
the share of persons incarcerated in the initial steady state. 
37These rates are calculated using the BJS Recidivism of Prisoners Released Series (United States Department of 
Justice. Oﬃce of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics (2011-03-08)). We take care to include only those 
re-imprisoned who are convicted of a new felony charge. This excludes those re-incarcerated in jails or re-imprisoned 
for violations of conditions of their parole, probation, or other conditions of release in order to be consistent with the 
concept of incarceration and crime used in the model and in targets from other datasets. The details of these data 
and our calculations can be found in the online appendix. 
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64) disciplines the probability of losing the high criminal capital, ξ. This is because we assume that 
only high criminal capital types receive crime opportunities when old. Using NACJD and Census 
data, we calculate approximately 0.5% of the old population is incarcerated. 
Finally, we include the change in the young-to-old incarceration ratio over 30 years as a target 
for our estimation. This ratio dropped by 40% in the NACJD data. We include this target 
because it is a key prediction of the simple model in Section 2 supporting the mechanism that 
an incarceration experience increases future criminality (Proposition 2.3). In the full model, the 
impact of an incarceration experience operates partially through the acquisition of criminal capital. 
In accordance with this calibration strategy, the shape of crime propensity over the life cycle is 
also largely determined by the fraction of crimes committed by high criminal capital individuals 
versus low criminal capital individuals. If all the crimes are committed by high criminal capital 
individuals, deterrence is zero and the life-cycle proﬁle is unaﬀected by changes in the policy. 
Early-life parameters There are two parameters regarding the early-life choice: those that 
determine the costs of choosing a higher crime arrival rate, A and ρ in equation 3.3. Given the 
curvature parameter ρ, we pick A such that at the initial steady-state individuals choose the crime 
arrival rate pinned down by the estimation targeting the initial steady state. The parameter ρ 
captures the elasticity of early-life choice. If this choice is very elastic, the model generates a highly 
non-monotonic path for incarceration rate along the transition whereas if the early-life choice is 
inelastic, incarceration rate follows a more monotonic path. We calibrate this parameter to match 
the non-monotonicity of the time series of the incarceration rate of young individuals over 30 years 
that we have data. Since our model cannot capture the total change in incarceration, we target 
the ratio of the diﬀerence in the incarceration rate between 2009 and 1980 and the diﬀerence 
between the maximum incarceration rate within this period and 1980 incarceration rate for young 
individuals. This ratio is 20% in the data. 
Table 2 shows the estimated parameters. Table 3 shows the performance of the model in 
matching the moments targeted. The model does a satisfactory job in capturing the moments 
targeted in the calibration.38 Two remarks are in order. The estimated parameter for the early-
life choice, A, implies agents spend around 1.3 times the annual income in the model to increase 
criminal opportunities in the baseline. This may seem to be high, but this parameter captures all 
foregone opportunities of choosing a higher criminal path which are not modeled here. The vacancy 
38In the online appendix, we discuss how removing elements such as criminal capital or prison ﬂag compromises 
the model’s ﬁt. We also provide robustness checks on some of the externally set parameters. 
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Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
 
Parameter Explanation Value
 
η crime arrival rate 0.038 
c vacancy cost 133.5 
δ separation shock 0.015 
ν prob of being high criminal-no prison 0.031 
νp prob of being high criminal-imprisoned 0.36 
ηhc crime arrival rate - high criminal 0.077 
ξ rate of switching from high to low criminal 0.028 
ψp human capital shock-incarcerated 0.010 
ψu human capital shock-unemployed 0.014 
ψe human capital shock-employed 0.011 
ς exponent for human capital grid 0.37 
ρ curvature parameter 1.91 
A constant in cost function 104796.5 
Notes: The Table shows the internally calibrated parameters of the model. See the main text for a discussion of 
the explanation of these parameters, and how they are identiﬁed in the model. 
Table 3: Model Match 
Moment Data Model
 
Incarceration - young and middle 3.9% 3.8% 
Incarceration - old 0.5% 0.5% 
Unemployment duration 20 weeks 20 weeks 
Employment rate - young and middle 71% 71% 
Recidivism rate (3 years) 20% 20% 
Fraction incarcerated by age 35 19% 19% 
Regression coeﬃcient-βA 0.0228 0.0225 
Regression coeﬃcient-βA2 -0.000425 -0.000224 
Regression coeﬃcient-βN -0.0045 -0.0044 
Regression coeﬃcient-βN2 -0.000025 -0.00015 
Change in young-old incarceration 40% 40% 
Change in incarceration for young 20% 20% 
Crime Arrival Rate in initial SS 0.038 0.038 
Notes: The Table shows a comparison of empirical and simulated moments. See Appendix for a detailed 
discussion for data sources on the empirical moments. 
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Table 4: Characteristics of Criminals
 
Criminals Overall Young 
Unemployment rate 26.1% 23.4% 28.7% 
Human capital-average 1.86 2.21 1.57 
Human capital among unemployed 1.54 1.90 1.45 
Human capital among employed 1.90 2.24 1.62 
Frac of high criminal capital 64.4% 5.6% 8.2% 
Prison Flag 35.8% 16.7% 6.7% 
Young and middle population 97.0% 36.2% -
Notes: The Table shows a comparison of various statistics for the individuals who commit crime and the overall 
population. 
cost is also higher than other papers in the literature. The main reason for this is to match very 
low employment rate (71%) of our sample of interest: young and middle age individuals with a 
high school education or less. 
Steady-State Analysis. 
To better understand how a change in punitive policy aﬀects crime, labor markets, and inequality, 
we ﬁrst discuss the determinants of crime in the initial (pre-1980’s) steady-state. 
Table 4 shows criminals diﬀer from the overall population along several dimensions. As expected, 
criminals are more likely to be unemployed, younger, with lower human capital and higher criminal 
capital, and more likely to have criminal record in their history. In the initial steady-state 74% of 
criminals are employed compared to 77% of the general population. However, they are employed 
at a much lower wage. In the initial steady-state, human capital of criminals is on average around 
20% lower than the population average (2.21 vs 1.86). 
The most important dimension of these data is that the majority of the crimes are committed 
by the individuals with high criminal capital and previously incarcerated individuals. The fraction 
of all individuals with high criminal capital among the population is 5.6% compared to 64.4% of the 
individuals that commit crime. Similarly, 16.7% of all individuals have a prison ﬂag compared to 
35.8% of the individuals that commit crime. This implies that most crime is committed by “career 
criminals” and that criminal capital drives the recidivism prevalent in the data. Criminal careers 
are mostly ended by the loss of criminal capital in old age. Subsequently, individuals over 35 have 
a crime rate one-eighth of those younger than 35. 
24
 
The next logical question is what determines who begins crime in the ﬁrst place? All individuals 
draw from the same crime reward distribution and face the same prison risk if they commit the 
crime. What may diﬀer across individuals is what they lose by going to prison. These opportunity 
costs are increasing in human capital and higher for those currently employed. Figure 5 shows 
the probability of committing crime conditional on receiving an opportunity for young individuals 
without criminal capital or a prison ﬂag. This probability decreases as human capital increases, 
notably at a faster rate for the lower half of the human capital range. 
1.5 2 2.5 3
Human Capital
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
Conditional Crime Probability
Figure 5: Determinants of Crime - Labor Status: The ﬁgure shows model generated crime probability 
conditional on receiving an opportunity as a function of human capital for a middle-age agent with low criminal capital 
and prison ﬂag. 
Whereas policy functions show the contribution of the current state to an individual’s crime 
entry choice, the impact on total crime in the economy depends on the distribution of individuals 
over this state. To better get at this contribution, we run a simple linear regression on individuals’ 
probabilities of committing crime within the week.39 Table 5 presents the marginal eﬀects of this 
regression. The average weekly crime probability in the economy is 0.77% per week, with a standard 
deviation of 1.8 percentage-points and a maximum of 8.7%. Focusing on the middle column, we 
see the crime entry choice is responsive to labor market outcomes, but not overly so. An increase 
in one standard deviation of wages reduces crime by 3-4% and gaining employment reduces crime 
by another 4.5%. These eﬀects may seem small, but they reﬂect the data the model is calibrated 
to match. The variance in wages for this population of young men without college is very small, 
39Speciﬁcally, the dependent variable uses the individual crime reward threshold to calculate the probability of 
receiving a crime reward above that threshold. Unemployed wage is the shadow wage. 
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Table 5: Crime Elasticities- Weekly Frequency
 
All Young- No Criminal Capital High Criminal Capital 
Middle 0.074 0.000 0.008 
Old -0.638 0.000 -1.088 
Unemployed 0.017 0.030 0.058 
Unemployed Wage -0.112 -0.119 -0.266 
Employed Wage -0.150 -0.134 -0.262 
Criminal Capital 7.746 0.000 0.000 
Prison Flag -0.005 0.002 0.001 
Constant 0.640 0.623 8.440 
Mean 0.77 0.68 8.4 
Max 8.7 0.74 8.7 
Standard Dev. 1.82 0.04 0.31 
Dependent variable is in basis points. For example, the mean weekly crime probability is 0.77%. 
so of course it does not provide much variation in crime outcomes. Furthermore, the separation 
rate from employment in the data is almost as high as the probability of going to prison if one 
commits a crime. This makes the opportunity cost of employment low. Criminal behavior in the 
data reﬂects this logic. We see most criminals are employed.40 
If the crime entry decision is driven by luck, is there any hope that improving labor market 
opportunities can end a criminal career? According to Figure 6(a), this is unlikely if an individual 
has accumulated high criminal capital. It shows they commit about 50% more crimes than those 
without criminal capital regardless of their human capital. However, Figure 6(b) is more optimistic. 
It shows a prison record itself does not put an individual on this path of higher crime. 
To summarize, the determinant of who commits crime is largely luck. Young individuals are 
similarly likely to enter a criminal path, it just depends on who draws a suﬃcient crime opportunity. 
From here criminal persistence is driven mostly by past criminal behavior through additional crimes 
among those with high criminal capital until this channel is eliminated by old age. This should not 
be interpreted as implying that economic conditions don’t matter. That is not true. For example 
40Criminals in the data do report lower wages, but we cannot see their wages at their ﬁrst crime. 
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Figure 6: Determinants of Crime - Criminal Capital and Incarceration: Both ﬁgures show 
model generated crime probability conditional on receiving an opportunity as a function of human capital for a 
middle-age employed individual. The left panel plots it across diﬀerent criminal capital and the right panel plots 
it for diﬀerent incarceration experience. Flagged are the ones who have been to prison and unﬂagged are the ones 
who have never been to prison before. The qualitative properties of the ﬁgures remain the same for the unemployed 
and/or young individuals. 
crimes arrive with 3.8% chance at a weekly frequency but from this the young only take about the 
top 20%, so they are being picky. It is just that the impact of wages is diminished because wages 
are compressed for the population of low skilled men we study implying little variation in wages 
to aﬀect variation in the likelihood of starting crime. However, if wages were raised for everybody, 
crime would go down (see Section 7.1). This population also faces relatively high separation rates. 
This lowers the deterrence of having a job today since one may expect to lose that job by tomorrow. 
6 Punitive Incarceration Reform- Crime and Incarceration 
In this section, we study the eﬀects of an increase in the probability of incarceration after committing 
a crime on aggregates like crime rates, incarceration rates, labor market variables and inequality. 
We assume the probability of imprisonment for a crime (π) permanently and unexpectedly increases 
from the 1980’s steady state of 2% to a higher value 8% similar to what we calculate for the US in 
2000.41 
41See the extended appendix for the assumptions we make in this calculation. 
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We begin by comparing steady states. To see how a change in π aﬀects the incarceration rate,
 
consider the probability of incarceration for an individual with current state s: πη (1 − H (κ∗ (s))). 
The overall crime rate is πη (1 − H (κ∗ (s))) dµ (s), where µ is the distribution of individuals 
across states. Increasing the probability of getting caught conditional on crime, π, aﬀects the 
overall crime rate through three channels. The ﬁrst is a direct “arithmetic” eﬀect by increasing π 
holding all else constant. The second is an indirect deterrence eﬀect through endogenous responses 
of the individuals of a given state s. They increase their crime reward thresholds, κ∗ (s), and 
decrease their early-life criminal intensity choice, η. The ﬁnal eﬀect is an indirect compositional 
eﬀect through a change in the distribution of individuals across states µ. The endogenous job 
creation response of ﬁrms contributes to this eﬀect.42 
The deterrence channel lowers crime and mitigates the mechanical impact of the ﬁrst arithmetic 
channel working to increase incarceration. Therefore, it is unclear whether an increase in π will 
increase or decrease incarceration rates. If the deterrence eﬀects are small, then the arithmetic 
eﬀect of higher conditional probabilities can dominate and increase the overall incarceration rate. 
This typically generates a “Laﬀer curve” type of non-monotonicity between π and the incarceration 
rate. In our model it is also unclear that crime rates should fall. It is true that at every state s, 
individuals raise their threshold κ∗ (s) and commit less crime. However, in our model a prison 
experience worsens an individual’s state and makes them more likely to do crime. In this way it is 
possible that an increase in π leading to an increase in incarceration will change the distribution of 
individuals across states enough to actually increase crime.43 
Table 6 shows the comparison of steady-states across two diﬀerent criminal justice policy 
regimes. We ﬁnd that, at the steady state, the direct arithmetic eﬀect of the increase in π dominates 
the other two channels. Incarceration increases as the criminal system becomes more punitive. We 
also ﬁnd that deterrence (and incapacitation) overwhelm the third channel provided by the prison 
experience. Crime decreases as the criminal system becomes more punitive.44 
42The online appendix provides an analytic exposition of these eﬀects within a simple model. 
43In Section 12 of the Online Appendix, we plot the incarceration rate as a function of π across steady-states in 
the calibrated model. It is non-monotone. 
44The strengths of these diﬀerent channels depend on the magnitude of π. In the appendix we provide comparative 
statics on steady states with respect to π illustrating this and the “Laﬀer Curve” eﬀect. 
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Table 6: Steady-State Comparison
 
Steady-State Variables SS1 SS2 
π = 2% π = 8% 
Incarceration - young 2.4% 2.7% 
Incarceration - middle 4.8% 5.2% 
Incarceration - old 0.5% 0.6% 
Incarceration - total 1.7% 2.0% 
Crime Rate 0.7% 0.2% 
Unemployment rate 23.4% 23.3% 
Recidivism rate-young 18% 44% 
Recidivism rate-middle 21% 52% 
Lastly employed when arrested 73.4% 69.6% 
Frac w/ high criminal capital 5.6% 2.6% 
With prison ﬂag 16.7% 14.4% 
High criminal capital among criminals 64.4% 62.4% 
Prison ﬂag among criminals 35.8% 53.5% 
Wage of criminals as a fraction of wage of employed 84.4% 77.7% 
Notes: The Table shows a comparison of two steady states, one with π = 2% and one with π = 8%. 
6.1 Transitional Dynamics. 
In Section 2 we argued that when criminal behavior is persistent the transition following a change 
in punitive policy can take several decades. This makes evaluation of the impact of the policy 
change diﬃcult. It also makes policy design diﬃcult because it provides unique costs associated 
with the policy change that are diﬀerentiated across cohorts. We then established the empirical 
relevance of this mechanism by showing cohort eﬀects in the data. We now study quantitatively 
how the channels of criminal persistence included in our model aﬀect these issues pertaining to the 
transition. 
The left panel of Figure 7(a) shows the evolution of the total incarceration rate along the 
transition. It starts at 1.7%, doubles in 5 years, and then gradually declines to the new steady-
state level of 2%. Interpreting these ﬁgures through the lens of the simple theory in Section 2, 
we see that the model calibrated to the 1980s steady state delivers a level of criminal persistence 
for those with criminal histories that is suﬃciently inelastic and an early life choice to enter a 
criminal career that is suﬃciently elastic to provide a non-monotone incarceration path over the 
transition. The criminal persistence of early cohorts engaged in crime under the old policy limits 
their response and drives the increase in incarceration rates in the short run. The response of the 
cohorts born under the new policy captures the full deterrent eﬀect and drives the fall to the new 
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steady state incarceration rate in the long run. The right panel of Figure 7(a) further reﬁnes our 
understanding of these elasticities. The criminal persistence of those with criminal histories is not 
so large as to increase crime in the short run. The potential impact of the prison experience to 
increase criminality is also not so large as to increase crime at any point along the transition. 
This non-monotone transition implied by the model calibrated to a steady state provides fur­
ther evidence that the evaluation of punitive policy inferred from short-run eﬀects is likely to be 
problematic for the US data. Measuring the increase in incarceration in the short and even medium 
run after the policy change provides little information about the eventual steady state eﬀect unless 
interpreted through the lens of an overlapping generations model such as the one we provide. It 
also shows that inferring the causal impact of changes in incarceration on crime using correlations 
between these time series is also a deeply ﬂawed approach. Crime falls as incarceration rises over 
the ﬁrst ten years of the transition but crime also falls as incarceration falls as the transition con­
tinues to the new steady state. The correct comparison would be to compare steady states and 
observe that incarceration rises and crime falls as the policy becomes more punitive. 
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Figure 7: Incarceration and Crime Rate over Time: Left panel: the evolution of the total incarcer­
ation rate over the transition. Right panel: the evolution of the aggregate crime rate over the transition. Aggregate 
crime rate is computed as the ratio of total crimes to the measure of non-incarcerated individuals. 
The transition in the model is also consistent with the cohort empirical motivation of Section 2 
backing this theory. Figure 8(a) shows the evolution of incarceration rate is diﬀerent for diﬀerent 
age groups. The incarceration rate of young individuals reaches its maximum in around 3 years, 
and converges to the steady-state level in around 30 years. However, the incarceration rate of old 
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individuals reaches its maximum in around 10 years, and converges to the new steady-state in more 
than 50 years. In terms of magnitudes, the middle-aged group sees the largest rise in incarceration 
rates in the short term, but the old-aged individuals have the largest permanent rise in the new 
steady-state. 
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Figure 8: Incarceration over Time: The ﬁgure shows the incarceration rate along the transition for diﬀerent 
age groups relative to their initial steady-state levels. 
The model does not generate a quadrupling of the incarceration rate as observed in the data 
and it predicts a transition that is too quick compared to the data. However, this is not a failure 
because this was not our goal. Instead, this experiment is an accounting exercise to isolate the 
impact of changes in punitive policy alone. In reality the policy was likely a reaction to changes in 
crime driven by other exogenous factors. In Section 7.1 we explore whether changes in the beneﬁt 
(crime reward) or opportunity cost (wages) can improve the model ﬁt. With respect to the speed of 
the transition, we assume that the policy change is sudden and one-time event. However, in practice 
the de facto implementation of policy changes was more gradual than the de jure reforms.45 
It is still useful to understand that there is a maximum increase in incarceration we can generate 
by increasing π alone as agents respond by lowering their crime rates (as explained in our “Laﬀer 
curve” discussion). This holds for a similar reason even if we change the calibration to increase 
the role of criminal capital and irrational crime. As we increase the probability of gaining criminal 
45A key constraint to such a drastic change in the use of punitive incarceration was capacity constraints. From 
1985 through 1990 ﬁfty to seventy percent of prisons were over capacity. In ﬁscal year 1990, congress allocated an 
additional $1 billion for physical investment in expanding buildings and facilities. Since 1993 incidence of overcrowding 
has remained below 40% (James (2013)). 
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capital or frequency of irrational crimes for those with high criminal capital, agents react by reducing 
the number of ﬁrst crimes committed. This endogenous reaction limits the scope of criminal capital 
to increase the incarceration rate. In other words, the irrational crimes are not a free parameter 
that enable us to match whatever we want. 
What drives the Non-Monotonicity of Incarceration? The extent of the rise in incarcera­
tion after a policy change and whether or not it rises more in the short run than in the long run 
depends on several factors. The full long run deterrent eﬀect is provided by changes in the early 
life choice, changes in the crime threshold rules of agents given a particular state, and how the 
distribution of agents over states changes over time. Figures 9(a) and 9(b) provide results of a 
counter-factual experiment in which we imagine if one or more of these factors were missing. The 
“benchmark” is the full model. The “no initial response” line keeps the early life choice ﬁxed at 
the ﬁrst steady state. The “no initial and ﬁrm response” line keeps both the early life choice and 
the market tightness ﬁxed. The “no response” line keeps all endogenous decision rules ﬁxed at the 
ﬁrst steady state: the early life choice, the market tightness, and the crime thresholds of agents 
conditional on their state. In this ﬁnal line all that remains is that the change in policy moves 
people around to diﬀerent states by sending them through prison more often. 
The change in individuals crime thresholds at a given state is quantitatively the most important 
factor in the model. It provides the movement from the “no response” line to the “no initial and 
ﬁrm response” line. All along the human capital distribution the typical agent raises their threshold 
enough to lower their crime probability by about 60% (See Figure 10). This change in behavior 
reduces the rise in incarceration by about 81% at the new steady state relative to if there were 
no endogenous responses in the model by amplifying the fall in crime by nine-fold. This is the 
classic deterrence channel studied in the literature. These graphs also show that the role of this 
channel grows as time passes: it reduces the rise in the incarceration by only 36% at year 5 by 
only amplifying the fall in crime by three-fold. Again, to emphasize the point: the classic channel 
of deterrence on the decline in crime has previously studied comparing steady states only and we 
ﬁnd its importance increases three-fold from year 5 to year 30 along a transition. 
The elasticity of the response of the early life choice of new generations to the observed policy 
change was estimated in our calibration strategy as a residual. We chose this parameter such that 
the model replicated the non-monotone shape of the prison admissions time series in the data. The 
estimated value implies a drop of crime arrival rates by about 25%: from 2.8% to 3.8%. Figures 
9(a) and 9(b) show that this plays a modest, but non-trivial deterrence role in the quantitative 
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Figure 9: Incarceration and Crime Over Time: The ﬁgures show the decomposition of the evolution 
of incarceration and crime rate along the transition. The solid line is the benchmark economy. The long dashed 
line is the economy when individuals keep their early life crime choices as in the ﬁrst steady-state. The dashed line 
is the economy when ﬁrms keep the same job creation level and individuals keep their initial choices as in the ﬁrst 
steady-state. Lastly, the dotted line is the economy when ﬁrms keep the same job creation level, individuals keep 
their initial and ex-post crime choices as in the ﬁrst steady-state. 
prediction- it moves from the ”no initial response” line to the ”benchmark” line. It plays a larger 
role in driving the non-monotonicity, but still the classic deterrence channel of changing policy rules 
provides about half of the decline from the peak in the benchmark model. How does this work? 
Recall that a main driver of who commits crime is luck: about two-thirds of crime is done by those 
who get good draws from the crime reward distribution as a youth and build criminal capital. The 
fall in the crime arrival rate due to the change in the early life choice lowers crime and incarceration 
by helping to lower the share of individuals engaged in crime in the population. 
The change in the market tightness provided by changes in ﬁrms’ job posting behavior has near 
zero impact on incarceration and crime. This is not to say that the tightnesses of labor markets do 
not change. They do, as we discuss next in Section 7. It is that the diﬀerential impact of employment 
and unemployment on decision rules governing the crime choice is very small. Therefore changes 
in employment rates do not aﬀect criminal behavior much. 
Role of the model’s assumptions. This decomposition answers how important diﬀerent chan­
nels are within the theoretical model we constructed, but how important are the assumptions of 
the model itself? We now explore how our assumptions of the early life choice and criminal capital, 
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Figure 10: Crime Rate over Time: The ﬁgure shows the crime probability for an unemployed individual 
as a function of human capital across two steady-states. 
relatively novel features of our theory, quantitatively contribute to these predictions of the model. 
Do we really need these and why? To do so, we ask how our results would look like if we omitted 
each of them individually, re-estimated the model to best ﬁt U.S. data, and re-ran our transitional 
experiment.46 Figures 11(a) and 11(b) show the results. The prison ﬂag has almost no impact on 
these aggregates, but this is something we learn from the model. We know that criminal records 
exist and are used in the labor market, but we learn that they have little impact on criminal behav­
ior at least through the channels we have in the model. Criminal capital is something not observed 
in the data and does change the results, so we focus the following discussion on why we have it. 
Criminal capital was added to the model to match a salient feature of criminal behavior: recidi­
vism. The recidivism rate for released prisoners targeted in the calibration was 20% over 3 years 
after release in the early 1980s. When we re-estimate the model by dropping the criminal capital 
assumption, we can still generate a rise in incarceration- though at a much smaller magnitude- but 
we can no longer match the initial steady state recidivism rate observed in the data. We under­
shoot by 6%. Furthermore, recidivism does not rise along the transition. This is also contrary to 
46More speciﬁcally, without prison ﬂag, we re-estimate the model to target the same set of moments in the bench­
mark economy. The only diﬀerence is that without prison ﬂag, we set the probability of being ﬂagged after incar­
ceration experience to 0. Without criminal capital we are left with seven parameters to be calibrated: crime arrival 
rate, vacancy cost, job separation rate, human capital shock arrival rate for employed and unemployed, the human 
capital grid parameter and the curvature of early-life choice. As in the benchmark economy, we target incarceration 
rate for young and middle-age, employment-rate for young and middle-age, average unemployment duration in the 
whole population, the regression coeﬃcients in equation 4.1 and the change in incarceration for young individuals 
over transition. The values of the parameters for each estimation is listed in the Appendix. 
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Figure 11: Model Assumptions: The ﬁgures compare the evolution of the economy in response to the policy 
change for diﬀerent model assumptions. The solid line plots the benchmark economy, the long dashed line plots model 
without prison ﬂag, and lastly the dashed line plots the model without criminal capital. In each case, parameters are 
re-calibrated to match certain moments of the data. See the text for a discussion of the re-calibration. 
the data. Using the Recidivism Among Released Prisoners (United States Department of Justice. 
Oﬃce of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics (2011-03-08)), we calculate the average 
recidivism rate on new charges doubled from 17.8% in 1983 to 35% in a Florida sample from 2003 
(Bhati (2010-07-29)).47 See Section 12 of the online appendix for graphs of recidivism dynamics 
disaggregated by age in both the model and data. Both show an increase and ﬂattening of the age 
proﬁle of recidivism. 
The key diﬀerence between the calibration with and without criminal capital is who commits 
crimes. With criminal capital, crimes are concentrated among a few individuals with a very high 
crime rate. Without it, crime is more spread across the population at lower rates for each individual. 
To achieve this, the calibration without criminal capital requires a much higher crime arrival rate. 
Interestingly, this increases the elasticity of crime to the policy change. When a larger distribution 
of people are committing crimes and the policy becomes tougher, the fall in crime is larger. This 
limits the model’s ability to match the increase in incarceration rate observed in the data. 
In summary, the criminal capital assumption is important for two reasons. First, it allows the 
47The recidivism rate increased to 27% in the 1994 iteration of the Recidivism Among Released Prisoners Series 
with the same design as the 1983 iteration. There is a version of these data for 2005, but we did not have access 
to the micro data and weren’t able to calculate the recidivism rate on new charges as would be consistent with our 
quantitative analysis. See the online Appendix for discussion of these datasets. 
35
 
model to be more realistic by matching the concentration of crime among a small population with 
high recidivism rates that increases when the policy becomes more punitive, just as in the data. 
Second, matching these moments matters for the quantitative predictions of the model. The long­
term impacts of the policy change can be quite diﬀerent in the model with or without criminal 
capital. Further, getting the channel of who commits crime correct in the model is important for 
an array of policy considerations. For example, in the world with criminal capital and few criminals 
committing the majority of crime, the incapacitation eﬀect of prison per capita is much larger than 
in a world where crime is widespread in the population. 
Changes in the Intensive and Extensive Margins of Crime. 
The Contribution of Incapacitation versus Deterrence. The above discussion can also be 
reframed through the classic lens used by criminologists to study the impact of criminal justice 
reform, namely: incapacitation and deterrence eﬀects. The incapacitation channel lowers crime by 
putting likely criminals in prison where they cannot commit crime. The deterrence eﬀect considers 
that more punitive policies lower crime by deterring individuals from committing crime in the ﬁrst 
place. 
These eﬀects are hard to measure in the data, but easy to isolate in our structural model. The 
incapacitation eﬀect is isolated in a counterfactual transition experiment by setting the time spent 
in prison to zero whilst maintaining the expected cumulative eﬀects of prison on human capital, 
the prison ﬂag, and criminal capital from the baseline model. The deterrence eﬀect is isolated in 
a second counterfactual transition experiment by ﬁxing the decision rules of the individuals and 
ﬁrms at the initial steady-state level along the transition. 
Figure 12(b) shows that both incapacitation and deterrence work to lower the crime rate, but at 
diﬀerent times and in diﬀerent magnitudes. In the short-run, the incapacitation eﬀect dominates. 
This “cleansing” of the population is important in the short run because deterrence is limited by 
the inelasticity of individuals’ crime choice due to the channels of criminal persistence in our model. 
In the long-run when the full deterrent eﬀect is realized it dominates the incapacitation eﬀect each 
respectively accounting for about 80% and 20% of the total decline in crime at the new steady 
state. 
Figures 12(c) and 12(d) show that both deterrence and incapacitation have signiﬁcant eﬀects on 
the employment and unemployment rates. The contribution of each channel is a bit by construction. 
While it is true that market tightness changes due to the response of ﬁrms’ vacancy posting, 
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the dominant mechanism is the assumption that once an individual is released from prison, he 
is unemployed. Since we maintain the cumulative impact of prison in this experiment, removing 
either incapacitation or deterrence increases the likelihood workers who commit crime lose their jobs 
through this mechanism. It also provides the asymmetric eﬀect of incapacitation and deterrence 
on employment. Without deterrence, employment permanently decreases by about 3% due to 
the higher share of the population imprisoned. Without incapacitation, employment permanently 
increases by about 1% due to a lower share of the population imprisoned freeing more persons to 
be eligible to work. The asymmetry in these magnitudes highlights the ﬁrms’ responses and the 
increased number of released prisoners churning through unemployment. 
7 Punitive Incarceration Reform- Labor Markets and Inequality 
Our structural model provides a unique environment to study the impact of large changes in 
punitive policy on aggregate employment and wages. The response of aggregate employment is 
modest: employment falls 1.5 percentage points in the short-run and recovers in almost 30 years. 
The impacts on younger agents and those with criminal records are larger. Figure 13(a) shows 
middle-aged individuals experience the largest drop in employment- a decline of 4%. This is because 
this group experiences the largest increase in the incarceration rate (Figure 8(a)). Figure 13(b) 
shows individuals ﬂagged with a criminal record experience a drop of around 6 percentage points 
in the employment-population ratio at the peak of the transition to 62% compared to 76% for the 
general population.48 
The fact that these cross-sectional diﬀerences across age are only present in the transition 
shows how the policy generates inequity in employment opportunities for a cohort. This contrasts 
the permanent inequity provided for those with a criminal record as seen in 13(b). This is due 
to two reasons. First, the direct eﬀect of increasing the probability of imprisonment conditional 
on committing a crime. As criminals churn more often through the prison, they are released to 
unemployment. The second is due to the endogenous response of ﬁrms vacancy posting behavior 
across labor markets indexed by age and prison record ﬂag (Figure 14(a)). Recall that ﬁrms use 
observable information on an individual’s age and prison record ﬂag to form expectations about 
the value of the match conditional on his unobservable human capital and criminal capital. Market 
tightness falls permanently for those with a prison record ﬂag, thus increasing unemployment 
48Flagged types start with substantially lower employment population ratio with respect to non-ﬂagged ones (68% 
vs 76%) 
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Figure 12: Incapacitation versus Deterrence: The ﬁgures compare the evolution of incarceration, 
crime rate, employment-population ration and unemployment rates along the transition without incapacitation or 
deterrence eﬀects. The solid line is the benchmark economy. The long dashed line is the economy when incapacitation 
is eliminated. The dashed line is the economy when all decision rules of the individuals and ﬁrms kept at the initial 
steady-state levels. 
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Figure 13: Employment across Diﬀerent Groups: The ﬁgures show the evolution of employment-
population ratio for diﬀerent individual groups. The left ﬁgure is across age dimension and the right ﬁgure compares 
the employment-population ratio for non-ﬂagged and ﬂagged individuals. Both are changes in percentage points 
relative to the initial steady-state level. 
duration, because the information provided by a prison record ﬂag changes. First, crime becomes 
more concentrated within a small population after the policy change. This implies a prison ﬂag is 
more indicative of high criminal capital; crime is mostly done by career criminals. Second, criminals 
cycle through prison more often and lose additional human capital after the policy change. This 
implies a prison ﬂag is more indicative of low human capital. 
The dynamics of market tightness for the old clearly show the diﬀerential impacts of incapaci­
tation, deterrence, and the prison experience over the transition. First, incapacitation dominates: 
the labor market is cleansed. Second, the prison eﬀect kicks in: imprisoned workers are released 
with low human capital. Finally, full deterrence is realized: new cohorts chose lower crime arrival 
opportunities thus increasing the expected duration of the match. 
The increased churning through prison also has a sizeable impact on wage inequality through 
the human capital depreciation channel. Figure 15(a) shows this creates temporary wage inequality 
across cohorts and Figure 15(b) shows this creates a large and permanent increase in wage inequality 
for those with a prison record. At the peak of the transition, human capital of those with a prison 
ﬂag drops almost 8% and only recovers to a 7% decline when comparing the new steady state to 
the old. These ﬁgures show that the policy widens the economic gap between the criminals and 
non-criminals substantially. 
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Figure 14: Market Tightness over Time: The ﬁgure on the left shows the dynamics of market tightness 
for the young individuals for both ﬂagged and non-ﬂagged individuals. The ﬁgure on the right shows the same 
statistics for the old individuals. 
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Figure 15: Human Capital across Diﬀerent Groups: The ﬁgures show the evolution of human capital 
for employed (a proxy for wages) for diﬀerent individual groups. The ﬁgure on the left is across age dimension. The 
ﬁgure on the right compares the dynamics of the average human capital for non-ﬂagged and ﬂagged individuals. Both 
ﬁgures show percentage change from the initial steady-state level. 
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Figures 16(a) and 16(b) illustrates the magnitudes of the mechanisms we have discussed using
 
the same counterfactual decomposition we explained in Section 6.1.
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Figure 16: Labor Markets over Time: The ﬁgures show the decomposition of the evolution the unem­
ployment rate and human capital of employed individuals. The unemployment rate is the ratio of the unemployed 
to the labor force. The solid line is the benchmark economy. The long dashed line is the economy when individuals 
keep their early life crime choices as in the ﬁrst steady-state. The dashed line is the economy when ﬁrms keep the 
same job creation level and individuals keep their initial choices as in the ﬁrst steady-state. Lastly, the dotted line is 
the economy when ﬁrms keep the same job creation level, individuals keep their initial and ex-post crime choices as 
in the ﬁrst steady-state. 
7.1 Interaction with Other Social and Economic Trends 
Our analysis thus far has considered a one-time, unilateral change in incarceration policy. In reality, 
it is likely that the policy changes were in response to changes in underlying criminality and that 
evolved concurrently. To this end, we consider two factors: secular increases in the reward to crime 
and a decline in low-skilled real wages. Our motivation to consider these particular factors is two­
fold. First, there is direct evidence that the spread of cocaine and associated gangs raised criminal 
involvement in the late 1980’s through the mid 1990s. There is also a literature on “skill-biased” 
technical change providing theory and evidence that technological innovations left the low-skilled 
behind compared to rising real wages for skilled-labor. We would like to know how these theories 
interact with punitive policy changes and whether they improve the model’s ability to account for 
the U.S. experience. The second purpose is that they provide comparative statics on the model. 
In particular, we argued in Section 5 that wage diﬀerentials do not explain much variation in the 
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cross section. Our experiments here show the quantitative response of aggregate outcomes respond
 
to changes in the mean of the wage distribution. 
Our experiments are as follows. We model the increase in crime reward to match the four­
fold increase in incarceration rate observed in U.S. data.49 We model the decrease in wages as a 
linear decrease in productivity over the ﬁrst 15 years to 25% lower than the initial steady state. 
Productivity remains at this lower value permanently from then on. Each experiment is run starting 
at the initial steady state in the benchmark economy and in conjunction with the same change in 
the probability of getting caught that we considered in the benchmark experiment. 
Figures 17(a) and 17(b) show, unsurprisingly, that higher crime rewards increase both crime 
and incarceration. While this change enables the model to replicate the magnitude of the increase 
in incarceration, it provides a counterfactual monotonic transition that contradicts the cohort 
evidence replicated by the benchmark model. Another departure from the benchmark is that crime 
follows a non-monotonic path. Similarly to the benchmark, the crime rate drops in the short run as 
individuals decrease their crime thresholds by responding to the higher punitive criminal system. 
Contrary to the benchmark, crime rises because higher criminal rewards result in future cohorts 
choosing a higher crime arrival rate in their early life choice. This implies that crime becomes more 
widespread in the society and contradicts empirical evidence that the opposite is the case. Both 
incarceration and crime rates also rise in comparison to the benchmark when labor productivity 
falls. The size of the impact is non-trivial. The empirically plausible fall in productivity delivers 
an increase in the population incarcerated at the new steady state by an entire percentage point, 
about 20% of the rise seen in the data. 
Figures 17(c) - 17(d), plot the responses of the labor market. An open question is how much 
of the decline in low-skilled male employment relates to changes in criminal justice policy. These 
ﬁgures show that complementarities between changes in criminal justice policy and either decreasing 
real wages or increasing rewards to crime can generate a decline in employment of 3-5 percentage 
points, respectively. This highlights the potential quantitative importance of considering these 
trends in future study of this population. 
49We achieve this by adjusting the mean of the log-normal distribution of the crime rewards, µκ. To match the 
quadrupling of the incarceration rate, we need to increase µκ from 0 to 0.7, which implies that the mean of the 
distribution almost doubles. 
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Figure 17: Other Factors: The ﬁgures compare the evolution of the economy in response to the policy change 
and some other factors aﬀecting the incarceration rate. The solid line plots the benchmark economy, the long dashed 
line plots the dynamics in response to the policy change and an increase in the mean of crime reward distribution, 
and lastly the dashed line plots the dynamics in response to the policy change and a gradual decrease in productivity. 
43
 
8 Conclusion 
We began this paper by arguing the importance of considering dynamics driven by criminal per­
sistence in the evaluation of punitive incarceration policy changes. We presented our argument 
rigorously by incorporating the theory in both a simple and a rich dynamic model. We bolstered 
the empirical relevance of our theory by providing both cohort and changing cross-sectional evidence 
consistent with the theory’s predictions relying on criminal persistence. 
To quantitatively evaluate policy changes, we developed a dynamic model grounded in the 
Beckerian theory of rational crime in which age, human capital, and employment all deter crime. 
We enhanced the model with additional channels: an early life choice and criminal capital developed 
with experience that each impact future crime opportunities as well as criminal records that segment 
labor markets. These channels enabled the model to replicate salient features of criminal behavior 
that pecuniary motives alone could not: high recidivism rates, even among the employed and 
old; and cohort dynamics after policy changes of the 1980s. Altogether we learned that luck in 
drawing a good crime opportunity is instrumental in the choice to enter crime and criminal capital, 
particularly that gained in prison, drives criminal persistence after youth. Adding things up, most 
crime is done by a few individuals with long criminal records for whom pecuniary factors provide 
little deterrence. 
The main application of the theory analyzed the impact of increased use of punitive incarcer­
ation akin to policy changes in the 1980’s and arrived at three substantive conclusions. First, the 
change in incarceration policy on its own had a minor contribution to trends in low skilled labor 
markets and a more substantive contribution to aggregate incarceration and the decline in crime. 
Second, the transition after a policy change follows nuanced dynamics that can take several turns 
over subsequent decades. Increases in incarceration initially “cleanse” the population of the worst 
criminals, who are also the worst workers. Later, the additional individuals who cycle through the 
prison re-enter the population with even worse labor market prospects and higher criminality than 
before. Full deterrent eﬀects are not realized until new cohorts are born under the new policy, 
choosing less crime and higher labor force attachment from early in life. Third, the theory uniquely 
predicts that crime becomes more concentrated in a smaller portion of the population who engage 
in crime more intensely. These changes in the extensive and intensive margins of crime mirrors 
empirical trends and provides further support to the validity of our theory. They also contribute 
to our result that increased punitive policy increases economic inequality within low-skilled popu­
lations. We spent ample time in the paper further discussing exactly what drives all three of these 
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predictions both qualitatively and quantitatively.
 
Our ﬁndings uniquely emphasize that the issue of dynamics need to be addressed when ap­
proaching questions related to both criminal justice policy evaluation and criminal justice policy 
design. Policy evaluation relying on econometric inferences on policy experiments must consider 
that short-run eﬀects of policy changes can run in directions that are opposite from long-run ef­
fects, as we have shown. Policy design must consider how the costs of sharp policy changes are 
borne unequally across cohorts. A speciﬁc prescription to be further researched is whether the 
announcement of increasing punitive policy in the future followed by a gradual implementation 
could improve welfare. This would allow a greater chance for agents to respond and potentially 
avoid a large increase in incarceration and its collateral eﬀects in the short term. 
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